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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OR LEGISLATIVE GRACE?
THE STATUS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
EXEMPTIONS
SPENCER E. DAVIS, JR.
C ONSCRIPTION is not currently used to fill the ranks of the
United States military,' but the mechanism necessary to imple-
ment the draft stands ready to be set in motion. Males between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-six are required to register with Selective
Service. 2 The Code of Federal Regulations contains provisions for the
induction of registered males to be used in the event that the draft is
reactivated.' These regulations and the portions of the United States
Code authorizing them4 contain express provisions concerning the ex-
emption of conscientious objectors from compulsory military service.'
1. The draft ended on July 1, 1973. Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, §
101(a)(35), 85 Stat. 353 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 467(c) (1988)).
2. Although no draft presently exists, President Carter reactivated the registration system
in 1980. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453
at 1246-48 (1988). Because registration is restricted to males, this Comment will use the male
pronoun throughout.
3. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1624-56 (1990).
4. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-471(a); § 454(a) states, in pertinent part:
The President is authorized, from time to time, whether or not a state of war exists, to
select and induct into the Armed Forces of the United States for training and service
in the manner provided in this title ... such number of persons as may be required to
provide and maintain the strength of the Armed Forces.
5. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1988); 32 C.F.R. §§ 1630.16-.17, 1633.6, 1636.1-.10 (1990).
The statute begins as follows:
Nothing contained in this title . . . shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to partici-
pation in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the term "religious training and
belief" does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code.
For thorough discussion of the meaning of "religious training and belief," see United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Seeger and Welsh
were decided under an earlier version of the statute. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j),
62 Stat. 604, 612 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1988)). In that version, the first
sentence was the same, but the second sentence read:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a rela-
tion to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal moral code.
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336. The "Supreme Being" wording was rendered practically meaningless by
Seeger and Welsh and was eliminated by Congress in 1967. Military Selective Service Act of
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40 § 7, 81 Stat. 100, 104.
192 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 19:191
The problem of exempting conscientious objectors from compul-
sory military service results from the conflict 6 between the commit-
ment to protection of religious beliefs exemplified by the free exercise
clause7 of the United States Constitution and the perceived necessity
of a military force for national survival exemplified by constitutional
delegation of power to Congress to "raise an army." '8 Because exemp-
tions, in one form or another, for conscientious objectors9 have been
included in every federal statutory scheme authorizing compulsory
military service in the United States since the Civil War, 0 the United
States Supreme Court never has been presented squarely with the issue
of whether conscientious objectors have a constitutional right under
the free exercise clause to an exemption from compulsory military
service." Therefore, the Court's "suggestions" that conscientious ob-
6. See Kellett, Draft Registration and the Conscientious Objector: A Proposal to Accom-
modate Constitutional Values, 15 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 167, 168 (1984):
This dilemma stems from the paradoxical situation arising from these premises: this
country was founded in part to protect the free exercise of religion; some persons'
religious beliefs include an opposition to bearing arms; at some time this country may
be threatened such that bearing arms may be militarily necessary for national survival;
and Congress' method of dealing with such threats has been and will be to "raise an
army." (citations omitted).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ) (emphasis added).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
9. This Comment will deal primarily with the right to exemption of general conscientious
objectors (objectors to war in all forms) as opposed to selective conscientious objectors (objec-
tors to particular wars or particular means of warfare). The lack of a free exercise right to
selective objection was dealt with-although in a very cursory manner-in Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1971). See infra text accompanying notes 89-106. For a discussion
of a number of issues relating to selective objection, see SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION:
ACCOMMODATING CONSCIENCE AND SECUnrrY (M. Noone, Jr., ed. 1989); see also Greenawalt, All
or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 31.
10. See Draft Act of 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9 (substantially amending Act of Mar. 3,
1863, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Stat. 731), cited in Note, The Right Not to Kill: A Critical Analysis of
Conscientious Objection and the Problem of Registration, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 655, 659 &
n.36 (1983) ("The earlier act contained no express provision for conscientious objectors, while
the 1864 Act contained the first federal military exemptions."); Selective Draft Act, ch. 15, § 4,
40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917), cited in Note, supra, at 659 & n.40; Selective Training and Service Act of
1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889, cited in Note, supra, at 659-60 &
nn.42-45; Selective Service Act of 1948, Ch. 625, § 6, 62 Stat. 604, 612-13 (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456() (1988)), cited in Note, supra, at 660 & nn.49-50; Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100, 104 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 456(j) (1988), cited in Note, supra, at 662 & n.61 ("This form of the conscientious objec-
tor provision ...is still current law."); cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 370 (1970)
(White, J., dissenting) ("However this Court might construe the First Amendment, Congress has
regularly steered clear of free exercise problems by granting exemptions to those who conscien-
tiously oppose war on religious grounds."); Kellett, supra note 6, at 171 n.26 ("Congress has
always granted . . . an exemption [for conscientious objectors].").
11. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 464-65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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jectors do not have a constitutionally guaranteed right to exemption
from compulsory military service 2 are nothing more than dicta and
should not be relied upon as binding precedent. 3
This Comment will analyze the cases used to support the contention
that exemptions for conscientious objectors are merely a "legislative
grace.' ' 4 Because this analysis concludes there is no authoritative
precedent regarding whether exemptions for conscientious objectors
are mandated by the free exercise clause of the first amendment, the
second part of this Comment will explore and analyze the Court's first
amendment case law to discover whether the law supports the conten-
tion that free exercise exemptions are indeed constitutionally guaran-
teed. This analysis will include a critique of the Court's abdication of
its duty carefully to weigh competing constitutional issues in this area
of the law.
I. Is THERE BINDING PRECEDENT REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTIONS TO COMPULSORY
MILITARY SERVICE?
The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear
arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied;
but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of
Congress thus to relieve him.' 5
The privilege of the native-born conscientious objector to avoid
bearing arms comes, not from the Constitution, but from the acts of
Congress. That body may grant or withhold the exemption as in its
wisdom it sees fit; and, if it be withheld, the native-born
conscientious objector cannot successfully assert the privilege. No
other conclusion is compatible with the well-nigh limitless extent of
the war powers as above illustrated, which include, by necessary
implication, the power, in the last extremity, to compel the armed
service of any citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or
12. See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 461 n.23 (Marshall, J., for the majority) ("We note that the
Court has previously suggested that relief for conscientious objectors is not mandated by the
Constitution.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 15-62. "'Dictum' or 'obiter dictum' is distinguished
from the 'holding' of the court in that the so-called 'law of the case' does not extend to mere
dicta, and mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis." 20 AM. JuR. 2d Courts
§ 74 (1965).
14. Note, supra note 10, at 663 (citing United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624
(1931); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974)).
15. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931).
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his views in respect of the justice or morality of the particular war or
of war in general.' 6
These passages are often cited for the proposition that exemptions
from compulsory military service for conscientious objectors are a leg-
islative grace. 7 The case from which these statements come, United
States v. Macintosh, is the cornerstone of the contention that "[i]t is
well settled that 'exemption from military service is a matter of legisla-
tive grace and not a matter of right."""
A. United States v. Macintosh
The statements quoted above leave no doubt that Justice Suther-
land, writing for the Macintosh Court, did not believe there was a
constitutional right to exemption from compulsory military service.
These statements, however, are by no means dispositive of the issue.
They are neither supported by precedent nor reached through any rea-
soned analysis. They are mere assumptions-premises in an argument
about an issue quite different from the issue of whether a conscien-
tious objector has a first amendment right to an exemption from com-
pulsory military service.
As then-Chief Justice Hughes made clear in his dissent, Macintosh
was not about "whether the Congress may in its discretion compel
service in the army in time of war . ... " 9 Rather, the issue in Macin-
tosh was whether the respondent, Macintosh, met the statutory re-
quirements of the Naturalization Act .20
Macintosh was born in Canada and moved to the United States in
1916.21 He declared his intention to become a citizen of the United
States in 1925, but his petition for naturalization was denied by the
district court because he would not promise without qualification to
bear arms in defense of the United States. He was, therefore, in the
eyes of the court, not sufficiently committed to the principles of the
16. Id. at 624.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Burns, 450 F.2d 44, 46 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 112 (Ist Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); United States v.
Crouch, 415 F.2d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 1969); Korte v. United States, 260 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1959); United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d 249, 252 (2d Cir.
1955); Pomorski v. United States, 222 F.2d 106, 107 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 941
(1955); Note, supra note 10, at 663. See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 n.23
(1971).
18. Korte, 260 F.2d at 635 (citations omitted).
19. 283 U.S. at 627 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
20. The Naturalization Act, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596 (1906).
21. 283 U.S. at 613.
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Constitution." The Naturalization Act required that before being ad-
mitted to citizenship, an alien had to prove "to the satisfaction of the
court," inter alia, that he or she was "attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States" and that he or she would "defend
the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic .... "23 Because of "important
qualifications"2' without which Macintosh would not take the oath of
allegiance, the Supreme Court found that he would not "take the oath
in accordance with the terms fixed by the law" and, therefore, was
not eligible for United States citizenship. 25 The Court held:
The burden was upon the applicant to show that his views were not
opposed to "the principle that it is a duty of citizenship by force of
arms when necessary to defend the country against all enemies, and
that [his] opinions and beliefs would not prevent or impair the true
faith and allegiance required by the Act." We are of the opinion that
he did not meet this requirement.26
Despite the Macintosh majority's rhetoric about the unqualified na-
ture of the duty to bear arms,27 this duty was not at issue. The only
issue in Macintosh was whether he sufficiently exhibited the allegiance
"required by the Act.'' 2
Furthermore, the only authority the Macintosh majority cited for
the sweeping claim that there was no constitutional right to a consci-
22. Id. ("[Slince petitioner would not promise in advance to bear arms in defense of the
United States unless he believed the war to be morally justified, he was not attached to the
principles of the Constitution.").
23. The Naturalization Act, ch. 3592, §§ 3, 4, 34 Stat. 596, 598 (1906) (quoted in Macin-
tosh, 283 U.S. at 605, 614).
24. 283 U.S. at 619. In a written addendum to his preliminary naturalization forms, Macin-
tosh wrote:
I am willing to do what I judge to be in the best interests of my country, but only in so
far as I can believe that this is not going to be against the best interests of humanity in
the long run .... I am not willing to promise beforehand, and without knowing the
cause for which my country may go to war, either that I will or that I will not "take
up arms in defense of this country," however "necessary" the war may seem to the
Government of the day.
It is only in a sense consistent with these statements that I am willing to promise to
"support and defend" the Government of the United States "against all enemies, for-
eign and domestic."
Id. at 618.
25. Id. at 626-27.
26. Id. at 626 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653
(1929)).
27. See supra quote accompanying note 16.
28. See supra the emphasized portion of the quote accompanying note 26.
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entious objector exemption from compulsory military service was Ja-
cobson v. Massachusetts:
[AInd yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will
and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests,
or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the
ranks of the army of his country and risk the chance of being shot
down in its defense. 29
The problem with using this statement from Jacobson to support the
dicta in Macintosh is that this statement from Jacobson is also dicta.
Jacobson involved the sole issue of the constitutionality of a Massa-
chusetts statute mandating vaccinations for smallpox. 30 The Massa-
chusetts statute in question was challenged as invalid under the
privileges and immunities clause, the due process clause, and the equal
protection clause.3 The free exercise clause was never mentioned in
the case. Indeed, the above-quoted statement marks the only time the
Court ever mentioned religion, which it did without citation and only
as an example of the great scope of the police power. The issue in
Jacobson was neither the constitutional right of individuals to exemp-
tion from compulsory military service nor the constitutional authority
of the Congress to compel military service.
Finally, besides the facts that a free exercise exemption to compul-
sory military service was not at issue in Macintosh and that Macin-
tosh, therefore, is not binding precedent on that issue,32 Macintosh
was explicitly overruled in 1946-albeit on different grounds.3 The
"different grounds," however, are revealing. The Court in Girouard
v. United States reiterated Chief Justice Hughes' dissenting admoni-
tion from Macintosh that Macintosh "involved, as does [Girouard], a
question of statutory construction. 3 4 In concluding Macintosh was
incorrectly decided," the Girouard majority did not even mention
Macintosh's sweeping constitutional claim that "[tihe conscientious
objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedience to
no constitutional provision, express or implied .... -"6 Apparently,
29. 283 U.S. at 624 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905)) (emphasis
added).
30. Jacobson, 197 U.S. I I passim.
31. Id. at 14 (statement of the case by Justice Harlan, who wrote the majority opinion).
32. See supra note 13.
33. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
34. Id. at 63.
35. Id. at 69.
36. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 623. Five justices comprised the majority in the Girouard deci-
sion (Justice Jackson did not take part, 328 U.S. at 70), and three justices dissented, 328 U.S. at
79. The dissenters did not mention Macintosh's implication-laden dicta either.
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the Girouard Court saw no reason to overrule-or mention, for that
matter-mere dicta.
B. Hamilton v. Regents of University of California
Another case often cited with Macintosh for the proposition that
there is no free exercise right to a conscientious objector exemption is
Hamilton v. Regents of University of California." Hamilton, how-
ever, like Macintosh, was not about a free exercise challenge to com-
pulsory military service. The Court in Hamilton decided the case
solely with regard to the "assertion that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a safeguard of 'liberty' confers the right to
be students in the State University free from obligation to take mili-
tary training as one of the conditions of attendance." 3 8
At issue in Hamilton were a California statute and an order prom-
ulgating that statute which required male students to take a prescribed
number of courses in military science and tactics as a condition of
attendance. 9 Hamilton and Reynolds, students at the University of
California, sought an exemption from this military training "upon the
ground of their religious and conscientious objection to war and mili-
tary training. '" 40 The university denied the exemption and suspended
Reynolds and Hamilton when they refused to participate in the train-
ing. 4' The Supreme Court of California upheld the denial of exemp-
tion; Reynolds and Hamilton appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, 42 asserting, inter alia, that compelling conscientious ob-
jectors to take part in military training in order to attend the univer-
sity deprived them of the free exercise of religion without due process
of law. 43
The Hamilton Court's analysis of the appellants' due process (free-
dom of religion) challenge consisted of a statement of the duty of
every citizen "to support and defend government against all
enemies"" and two paragraphs of quotes from United States v.
37. 293 U.S. 245 (1934), cited in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 n.23 (1971).
See also In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 572 (1945) ("[Clonscientious objectors to participation in
war in any form now are permitted to do non-war work of national importance, this is by grace
of Congressional recognition of their beliefs.") (citing Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 261-265).
38. 293 U.S. at 262.
39. Id. at 255-56 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 253.
41. Id. at 253-54.
42. Id. at 257.
43. Id. at 248 (argument for appellants).
44. Id. at 262-63 (citing Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918); Minor v.
Happersatt, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 166 (1874)).
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Schwimmer,45 Macintosh, and Jacobson.46 The quotes from Macin-
tosh and Jacobson were the ones that appear above. 47 The quote from
Schwimmer was:
That it is the duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our
government against all enemies whenever necessity arises is a
fundamental principle of the Constitution....
Whatever tends to lessen the willingness of citizens to discharge
their duty to bear arms in the country's defense detracts from the
strength and safety of the government."
On the basis of this precedent, the Hamilton Court held that no
ground existed for the contention that the regulation at issue violated
any constitutional right asserted by the appellants. 49
C. United States v. Schwimmer and In re Summers
As the above discussion illustrates, United States v. Schwimmer50 is
also cited as precedent for the contention that there is no constitu-
tional right to a conscientious objector exemption to compulsory mili-
tary service.5 Schwimmer, like Macintosh, was a naturalization case.
In response to a question on a preliminary naturalization form,
Schwimmer declared that she would not take up arms in defense of
the United States because of her uncompromising pacifism.5 2 She said
that she would, however, be willing to do anything to serve the United
States except fight." The district court found that she would not take
the prescribed oath and held that she was thus not sufficiently at-
tached to the principles of the Constitution. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the district court.54
Unlike Macintosh and Hamilton, however, Schwimmer does not
even mention the constitutional/legislative status of conscientious ob-
jector exemptions. Besides the above-quoted statements about the
duty of citizens, 5" the only part of Schwimmer even remotely relevant
45. 279 U.S. 644 (1929), overruled by, Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
46. Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 263-64.
47. Supra text accompanying notes 15, 16, & 26.
48. 279 U.S. at 650 (cited in Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 263).
49. Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 265.
50. 279 U.S. 644 (1929), overruled by, Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
51. See, e.g., Korte v. United States, 260 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 928 (1959).
52. 279 U.S. at 647-48.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 653.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 44 & 48.
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to the exemption issue is a paragraph expounding the theme, "The
common defense was one of the purposes for which the people or-
dained and established the Constitution."5 6 This paragraph culminates
with the following statement: "[T]he very conception of a just govern-
ment and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of
the citizen to render military service in case of need . . . . ,,17 Accord-
ingly, Schwimmer is even weaker precedent than Macintosh for the
proposition that conscientious objector exemptions are a matter of
legislative grace. Schwimmer does not even make this assertion in
dicta. Moreover, Schwimmer, like Macintosh, was a naturalization-
not a free exercise-case and was overruled by Girouard.5 8
In re Summers59 also has been cited to support the suggestion that
"relief for conscientious objectors is not mandated by the Constitu-
tion.'' Summers, however, suffers from the same defects as Hamil-
ton. The issue in Summers was not whether there was a
constitutionally guaranteed right to conscientious objector exemp-
tions, and the only precedents cited by the Summers Court for its as-
sertion that conscientious objectors received exemptions "by grace of
Congressional recognition of their beliefs" are Hamilton "and cases
cited."'61
Macintosh, Hamilton, Schwimmer, and Summers are the bases
for the misapprehension that it is a settled matter of law that consci-
entious objector exemptions to military service are not constitutionally
mandated. These cases, and cases citing them, appear to be the only
precedent for this proposition. Although "[ilt has been repeatedly rec-
ognized that exemption for military service is a matter of Congres-
sional grace rather than constitutional compulsion," 62 this recognition
was premature. The matter has not been settled.
II. DOES THE COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT CASE LAW SUPPORT THE
CONTENTION THAT THERE IS A FREE EXERCISE RIGHT TO EXEMPTION
FROM COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE?
Although attempting to divine the meaning of the free exercise
clause from the record left to us by the Framers of the Constitution is
56. 279 U.S. at 650.
57. Id. (quoting the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (citing VArTEL,
LAw OF NATIONS (1863))).
58. 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
59. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
60. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 n.23 (1971). See also United States v.
Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); United States v.
Bendik, 220 F.2d 249, 252 (2d Cir. 1955).
61. 325 U.S. at 572.
62. Boardman, 419 F.2d at 112.
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currently a popular enterprise, 63 this Comment will attempt no such
divination. Instead, this section will analyze the issue of conscientious
objector exemptions from compulsory military service in relation to
the Court's first amendment case law. A natural place to begin is with
an examination of the Court's rulings pertaining to first amendment
challenges to the draft. This analysis will be followed by a brief dis-
cussion of the case law concerning the more general issue of free exer-
cise challenges to generally applicable, neutral laws.
As mentioned in the introduction, two factors in draft law make the
possibility of a free exercise challenge to compulsory military service
coming before the Court rather unlikely in the near future. First, al-
though registration is currently required of men between eighteen and
twenty-six, no actual draft now exists." Second, since 1864 Congress
always has included a statutory exemption for conscientious objec-
tors, 65 and the current statutes (and regulations promulgating them)
that would be put into effect if the president reactivated the draft con-
tain such an exemption. 66 Armed services experts, however, have
called for the reinstatement of the draft on a number of occasions, 67 a
majority of the American public seems to support a draft, 68 and a re-
vived draft might not allow conscientious objector exemptions. 69
Given the possibility of a revived draft that does not contain an
express provision for conscientious objector exemptions, the following
analysis will proceed on the assumption that a free exercise challenge
seeking exemption for a conscientious objector from compulsory mili-
tary service is possible. 70
63. See, e.g., McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). Cf. L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
64. See supra note 1.
65. See supra note 10.
66. See supra note 5.
67. See Experts Disagree on the Draft, Tallahassee Democrat, Nov. 30, 1990, at IA, col. 5
(former top Pentagon official James Webb and Senators John Glenn, D-Ohio, and Sam Nunn,
D-Georgia, agreed the draft should be imposed if U.S. troops were ordered to drive Iraq from
Kuwait); Military Draft Ready, But Leaders Vow Not to Use It, Tallahassee Democrat, Dec. 15,
1990, at IA, col. 2.
68. Military Draft Ready, But Leaders Vow Not to Use It, supra note 67, at IA, col. 4
(citing an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll finding that 58% of Americans favored and 38070 op-
posed reinstituting the draft "if the United States goes to war in the Persian Gulf").
69. See id. at 3A, col. 4 (noting that few exemptions would be allowed if the draft were
reinstituted). Although the current statutes contain a conscientious objector exemption, Con-
gress would have to authorize a revived draft, and in doing so it could leave out any or all
exemptions.
70. I will not consider the free exercise arguments that could be made against compulsory
registration (as opposed to induction). These arguments have been considered in Kellett, supra
note 6, and Note, supra note 10.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION EXEMPTIONS
A. Case Law Concerning the Draft
The Selective Draft Law Cases,7' although actually addressing the
issue of compulsory military service-unlike Macintosh, Hamilton,
Summers, and Schwimmer-are no more instructive than these four
cases regarding the issue of a free exercise right to a conscientious ob-
jector exemption. These cases involved, inter alia, a first amendment 72
challenge to Congress' power to compel military service." The opi-
nions in these cases, however, amounted to no more than a historical
and constitutional justification for the power of Congress to compel
military service. 74
The appellants were prosecuted for failing to present themselves for
registration for a selective draft75 authorized by an act of Congress. 76
They all defended by denying that there had been conferred by the
Constitution upon Congress the power to compel military service by
a selective draft and [asserted that even] if such power had been
given by the Constitution to Congress, the terms of the particular act
for various reasons caused it to be beyond the power and repugnant
to the Constitution.7 7
The Court, then, began its review of the constitutional questions78
with the statements:
The possession of authority to enact the statute must be found in
the clauses of the Constitution giving Congress power "to declare
war; . . . to raise and support armies ..... " And of course the
powers conferred by these provisions like all other powers given
carry with them as provided by the Constitution the authority "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers." 79
Although the Court did not at this point explicitly mention the free
exercise clause, the Court did consider the argument that:
71. 245 U.S. 366 (1918). Six appeals from district court convictions for not registering for
the draft were argued before the Supreme Court at the same time. Id. at n. 1.
72. See infra text accompanying note 85.
73. 245 U.S. at 376-77.
74. Id. at 376-89.
75. Id. at 376.
76. Id. at 375 (citing Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76).
77. Id. at 376.
78. Id. at 376-77.
79. Id. at 377 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
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[B]ecause as compelled military service is repugnant to a free
government and in conflict with all the great guarantees of the
Constitution as to individual liberty, it must be assumed that the
authority to raise armies was intended to be limited to the right to
call an army into existence counting alone upon the willingness of the
citizen to do his duty in time of public need .... 80
The Court then attempted to demonstrate that "the premise of this
proposition is so devoid of foundation that it leaves not even a
shadow of ground upon which to base the conclusion." 81
This demonstration consisted of more than ten pages of history of
the government's right to compel military service and citizens' duty to
render military service.12 In the last two paragraphs the Court finally
considered the challenges to the draft based on the "repugnancy to
the Constitution supposed to result" from the act authorizing the
draft."3 After briefly addressing a few challenges to the act's delega-
tion of power," the Court dismissed the first amendment challenge
with one conclusory sentence:
And we pass without anything but statement the proposition that an
establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise
thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the
exemption clauses of the act to which we at the outset referred
because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do
more.
8 5
Although at least one of the Court's later cases apparently gave more
consideration to free exercise claims about the draft, 6 it is questiona-
ble whether the Court has ever really "pass[ed] without anything but
statement" free exercise challenges to the draft.8 7
Of the Supreme Court's three famous conscientious objector
cases-United States v. Seeger,88 Welsh v. United States,8 9 and Gillette
v. United Statesg°-only Gillette actually considered a free exercise
80. Id. at 378.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 378-89.
83. Id. at 389.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 389-90.
86. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 88-106.
88. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
89. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
90. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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challenge to compulsory military service. 9 Seeger's first paragraph
mentioned a "constitutional attack . . launched under the First
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,"' 92 but did
not mention these attacks again;93 Welsh was decided strictly on the
basis of statutory construction and never even mentioned a free exer-
cise issue.9
Gillette involved the "question whether conscientious objection to a
particular war, rather than objection to war as such, relieves the ob-
jector from responsibilities of military training and service." 95 The
Court held, "Congress intended to exempt persons who oppose par-
ticipating in all war-'participation in war in any form'-and that
persons [like Gillette] who object solely to participation in a particular
war are not within the purview of the exempting section . . .
Thus, in Gillette the Court had occasion to go beyond the statutory
questions upon which Seeger and Welsh were decided. After
rejecting97 an establishment clause challenge that claimed the exemp-
tion "impermissibly discriminate[dl among types of religious belief
and affiliation,"98 the Court considered the claim that "Congress in-
terferes with the free exercise of religion by conscripting persons who
oppose a particular war on grounds of conscience and religion." 99 Al-
though the free exercise claim in Gillette was "examined in some iso-
lation from the circumstance that Congress has chosen to exempt
those who conscientiously object to all war,"'1' the Court's treatment
of the challenge is instructive of how the Court might handle a free
exercise claim by a general (as opposed to a selective)'0 ' conscientious
objector.
The Supreme Court's free exercise analysis in Gillette began with
the statement, "Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the
proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an ob-
91. See infra text accompanying notes 95-106.
92. 380U.S. at 165.
93. This is apparently because the Court construed the statute at issue, Universal Military
Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958), to include the petitioners-Seeger,
Jakobson, and Peter-within the statute's exemption for conscientious objectors, thus avoiding
the constitutional question. 380 U.S. at 186-88.
94. 398 U.S. at 343-44. Welsh, like Seeger, was solely concerned with construing section 6(j)
of the Universal Training and Service Act. See supra note 93.
95. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 439.
96. Id. at 447.
97. Id. at 449-460.
98. Id. at 449.
99. Id. at 461.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 9.
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jector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government."' 10 2
After briefly discussing the effect of the free exercise clause on the
direct regulation of religious beliefs,' 03 although such direct regulation
was not at issue in the case, the Court continued:
And even as to neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular
aims, the Free Exercise Clause may condemn certain applications
clashing with imperatives of religion and conscience, when the
burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the
Government's valid aims .... However, the impact of conscription
on objectors to particular wars is far from unjustified.... The
incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners' position are strictly
justified by substantial governmental interests that relate directly to
the very impacts questioned. 104
The Court was thus analyzing the free exercise claim in Gillette ac-
cording to the balancing test used in Sherbert v. Verner.'15 The
Court's consideration of the respective interests in Gillette, however,
was extremely superficial. A conscientious objector who is forced into
military service could quite conceivably be placed in a situation in
which he must act either entirely against his conscience by taking a
human life or in accord with his conscience at the risk of losing his
own life. The Court in Gillette did not make the slightest effort even
to identify the burdens on free exercise that resulted as an incident of
the conscription laws.'06
The "substantial governmental interests" to which the Gillette
Court refers are "the Government's interest in procuring the man-
power necessary for military purposes"107 and "the interest in main-
taining a fair system for determining 'who serves when not all
serve." ' '  This first interest is recognized in the first article of the
United States Constitution.'09 It is difficult to imagine, however, that
this interest is furthered by forcing a person into the military even if
that person believes that the objective of the military, either in general
or with respect to a particular war, is unconscionable. The probability
that a conscientious objector would refuse to participate in military
102. 401 U.S. at 461 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 462.
104. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961)) (other citation omitted).
105. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See infra text accompanying note 124.
106. See 401 U.S. at 461-63.
107. Id. at 462.
108. Id. at 455.
109. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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exercises should be enough at least to call into question the benefits to
"procuring the manpower necessary for military purposes" by draft-
ing conscientious objectors. The efficacy of drafting conscientious ob-
jectors is further challenged by the probability that a pacifist not only
will "refuse[] or [be] unwilling for any purpose to bear arms because
of conscientious considerations" but also will be "disposed to encour-
age others in such refusal."" 0
Indeed, as the Court has recognized in dicta, "The influence of
conscientious objectors against the, use of military force in defense of
the principles of our government is apt to be more detrimental than
their mere refusal to bear arms.""' Is the government's interest in
"procuring the manpower necessary for military purposes" furthered
by drafting someone who not only will refuse to fight but also will try
to discourage other draftees from fighting? Would not the presence
within the military of pacifists preaching nonviolence be more of a
hindrance to, rather than a furtherance of, military purposes?
Of course, the administrative interest in "maintaining a fair sys-
tem" for exempting people from compulsory military service is sub-
servient to and an integral part of the broader interest in procurement
of manpower. The conclusion, however, that this broader interest is
served by a system in which conscientious objectors are forced into
military service is subject to the above criticisms of drafting conscien-
tious objectors. In holding that the "incidental burdens felt by per-
sons in petitioners' position are strictly justified by substantial
governmental interests, ' " 2 the Court did not even question whether
the draft act as applied to the petitioners would achieve the govern-
ment interests asserted.
The Court's custom of giving such minimal scrutiny to first amend-
ment challenges to military priorities has been roundly criticized." 3 In
the context of a free exercise challenge to a military regulation in
which the Court upheld the regulation, Justice Brennan dissented with
this admonition:
Today the Court eschews its constitutionally mandated role. It
adopts for review of military decisions affecting First Amendment
rights a subrational-basis standard-absolute, uncritical "deference
110. Macintosh v. United States, 42 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1930), rev'd, 283 U.S. 605 (1931)
(quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 652 (1929) (emphasis added).
I 11. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 621 (1931) (quoting Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at
651).
112. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
113. See, e.g., Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other
"Special Contexts, " 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779 (1988).
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to the professional judgment of military authorities." If a branch of
the military declares one of its rules sufficiently important to
outweigh a service person's constitutional rights, it seems that the
Court will accept that conclusion, no matter how absurd or
unsupported it may be.' 4
The majority in this case, Goldman v. Weinberger, began its free exer-
cise analysis with the statement that "review of military regulations
challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than
constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civil-
ian society.""' In its two-page "analysis" the Court made no effort
to discern any burden the regulation might have had on the individual
asserting the free exercise claim. Apparently, the Court uses the same
standard for evaluating free exercise challenges to Congress' decisions
relating to securing personnel for the military.
The Court has stated that "judicial deference to . . .congressional
exercise[s] of authority is at its apogee when legislative action under
the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make
rules and regulations for their governance is challenged."" 16 Although
the Court followed this conclusion with the statement that "deference
does not mean abdication, ' " 7 with respect to first amendment chal-
lenges to Congress' power to raise and support an army the Court's
"regimen of judicial deference to abstract governmental interests [in
place of] a weighted balancing of the competing interests'"'" amounts
to an abdication of the Court's "constitutionally mandated role."" 9
B. The Demise of the Sherbert Test's Applicability to Neutral,
Generally Applicable Laws-Employment Division v. Smith
The prospect of a Supreme Court decision upholding opposition to
compulsory military service as a free exercise right became even dim-
mer in 1990 with the delivery of Employment Division v. Smith. 20
Before Smith, it was generally assumed 2' that free exercise challenges
to neutral, generally applicable laws would be analyzed according to
the balancing test enunciated in Sherbert v. Verner.'2 The Court used
114. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 515 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (cited in Dienes, supra note 113, at 808 n. 108.).
115. Id. at 507 (Rehnquist, I., for the majority).
116. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
117. Id.
118. Dienes, supra note 113, at 827.
119. See supra text accompanying note 114.
120. 110S. Ct. 1595(1990).
121. See, e.g., L. TaRE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTiONAL LAW § 14-13, at 1255-74 (2d ed. 1988).
122. See infra text accompanying note 124.
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this test in Gillette, as discussed above.2 3 Sherbert held that if a stat-
ute infringes on an individual's constitutional right to free exercise of
religion, then the state must demonstrate that "any incidental burden
on the free exercise of [that individual's] religion may be justified by a
'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the
State's constitutional power to regulate .... '114
In Smith, however, the Court held that this test was
"inapplicable' '21 5 in such cases because:
The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions
of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects
of public policy, "cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development." To make an individual's obligation to obey such a
law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs,
except where the State's interest is "compelling" -permitting him,
by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself,"-
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. 26
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Smith, 27 discounted the pre-
vious uses of the compelling interest balancing test to analyze gener-
ally applicable laws that were challenged on the grounds of free
exercise with the statement that:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone,
but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections .... 128
The Court then said, "[W]e have never invalidated any governmental
action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemploy-
ment compensation. Although we have sometimes purported to apply
123. See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.
124. 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
125. 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
126. Id. (citations omitted).
127. Six justices-Scalia, Kennedy, White, Stephens, Rehnquist, and O'Connor-comprised
the majority. Justice O'Connor, however, concurred only with the judgment and adamantly re-
fused to accept the majority's "disregard [of] our consistent application of free exercise doctrine
to cases involving generally applicable regulations that burden religious conduct." Id. at 1607
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall agreed with
Justice O'Connor on this point, but did not join in the majority's judgment. Id. at 1606 n.*.
128. Id. at 1601.
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the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the
test satisfied .... "129 Justice Scalia cited Gillette as one of the cases
in which the Court "purported" to use the test. 30
III. CONCLUSION
Although no binding precedent exists on the specific issue of
whether conscientious objector exemptions from compulsory military
service are guaranteed by the free exercise clause, the Court probably
would hold that such exemptions are not constitutionally mandated.
Judging from its other first amendment cases involving Congress'
power to raise and support armies, the Court likely would simply
defer to Congress with little or no consideration of the burdens that
compulsory military service would place on the individual challenging
compulsory service on conscientious grounds.
The likelihood of the Court holding that there is a constitutional
right to conscientious objector exemptions is further diminished by
the Court's holding in Smith. Although it is conceivable that a free
exercise challenge to compulsory military service could be "con-
joined" with another constitutional challenge, thus triggering a bal-
ancing test analysis, the Court's deference to Congress' decisions
involving the armed forces would probably lead the Court to rule
against even such a "reinforced" challenge.' 3'
129. Id. at 1602 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. Justice Scalia used the word "reinforced" in Smith: "And it is easy to envision a case in
which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exer-
cise Clause concerns." Id. Smith leaves open the question of whether, and to what extent, a free
exercise concern would add any "weight" to another constitutional challenge.
